The Campaign Dynamics of Economic Voting
The link between the state of the economy and the vote is ubiquitous, but it is not invariant. We know that the relationship varies across space-across nations and institutional contexts (Powell and Whitten 1993; Anderson 1995; Royed, Leyden and Borelli 2000; Nadeau, Niemi and Yoshinaka 2002; Palmer and Whitten 2003) . Does the link also vary over time? In particular, does the relationship between the economy-or, more precisely, perceptions of economic performance-and vote choice change over the course of election campaigns?
Theory suggests diverse possible answers. The most common assumption is that the impact of the economy grows with time in the campaign (Markus 1988 (Markus , 1992 Bartels 1992, Forthcoming; Finkel 1993; Gelman and King 1993; Campbell 2000 Campbell , 2001 ; see also Johnston, Hagen and Jamieson 2004) . The claim is intuitively plausible and rests on a simple premise: one candidate or another always has an incentive to emphasize economic considerations in their campaign appeals (Campbell 2001) . In good times, governing parties seeking reward have a strong incentive to prime economic considerations. In bad times, opposition parties seeking to effect punishment have an equally strong incentive to draw voter attention to the economy. Thus, to the extent that campaign discourse has a decisive impact on the set of considerations voters emphasize on election day, the typical campaign should witness a (more or less) steady increase in the impact of economic evaluations on vote choice. 1 But the campaign may also divert voter attention from economic considerations. The literature on cognitive heuristics, at least in its more rationalist formulations, suggests that 1 The only direct evidence supporting the claim is in Bartels (Forthcoming) . Pooling survey data from two decades of US presidential elections, he finds that the impact of the economy is typically twice as large at the end of the campaign than at the beginning. A spate of more indirect evidence corroborates this conclusion, most of it also drawing on the US case (Gelman and King 1993; Finkel 1993; Campbell 2000; Bafumi, Gelman and Park 2004) . Outside the US the case is less convincing: existing evidence is almost entirely indirect and support for the hypothesis is "modest" at best (Stevenson and Vavreck 2000; Arceneaux 2004; Sekhon 2004 ; but see Andersen, Tilley and Heath 2005) . Even in the US the case for the conventional wisdom is looking shaky, especially in the wake of Election 2000: that year, the economy seemed to be the dog that just wouldn't bark (Johnston, Hagen and Jamieson 2004; see also Campbell 2001; Holbrook 2001; Norpoth 2001). part of the impulse to rely on economic evaluations, partisanship and the like in political reasoning stems from the desire to economize on cognitive effort (Downs 1957; Popkin 1991; Lupia and McCubbins 1998; see also Fiorina 1981) . Absent the informational onslaught of the campaign, perhaps the most ubiquitous source of knowledge about government performance comes from the individual's experience in the real economy. 2 Insofar as the link between the economy and evaluations of the government is obvious, the typical individual outside of the campaign period may base much of his/her assessment of political incumbents on economic evaluations. The start of the campaign could easily stifle this reasoning process, as non-economic considerations-issues, candidate evaluations, etc.-suddenly seem more relevant to vote choice, as indeed they may be. Thus, economic effects might decline as the campaign begins, even as they may recover closer to election day.
A third possibility is that the campaign has no regular impact on the economy-vote link.
If campaigns really matter-that is, if campaigns sometimes have an impact on election outcomes that cannot be predicted in advance (Johnston et al. 1992; Holbrook 1996; Shaw 1999 )-then we have little reason to expect any particular pattern in the campaign dynamics of economic voting to be common across elections.
The key empirical questions are, thus: is there a pattern?; and, if so, what is it? The present paper seeks to answer these questions by drawing on a body of data uniquely suited to analysis of campaign dynamics: the ten rolling cross-section (RCS) election studies conducted in Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States between 1988 and 2003. RCS survey methodology essentially produces a random sample of respondents for each day of the survey period (typically the length of the campaign), permitting analysis of subtle dynamics in voter cognition as the campaign unfolds (Johnston and Brady 2002) . Deploying these data thus affords a direct 2 Popkin (1991) makes the strongest argument for this view. examination of the campaign dynamics of economic voting, one that is comparative and, in the main, unprecedented.
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The implications of the analysis are both theoretical and practical. On the theoretical side, the results clearly speak to arguments about 'campaign enlightenment'-in short, the view that the major effect of the campaign is to inform voters about and draw voter attention to a set of 'fundamental variables' (the economy, issues, partisanship) relevant to the vote decision (Gelman and King 1993) . The campaign dynamics of economic voting are a crucial test of this hypothesis, insofar as economic evaluations are at least potentially responsive to changes in real world conditions-something that is hard to say for some of the other 'fundamentals,' like partisanship. On the practical side, the analysis is also relevant to election forecasting models-which typically include representations of the economy as crucial terms-and the interpretation of trial heat polls. For the former, the results may help to clarify when the forecasting models are likely to 'work'; for the latter, the analysis speaks to the question of what campaign period polls typically 'mean,' and when they mean it. More on these points below.
The paper is organized as follows. First, a search for regular trends in the dynamics of economic effects on vote choice. This proceeds through estimation of vote equations that model the impact of 'campaign time' on the magnitude of economic effects. Results here lead to a second, more inductive stage in the analysis, which focuses on graphical renderings of day-to-day changes in economic effects across the elections. This 'closer look' at the dynamics gives pause for reconsideration of some of the trends suggested in the first section of the paper and also uncovers something unexpected: an apparent pattern in the dynamics of economic effects not contemplated in the existing literature on campaigns. The paper closes with concluding discussion.
Modelling the Campaign Dynamics of Economic Effects

Methodology
As noted above, the data for this analysis are RCS survey data collected during ten different elections across four different countries. The election studies are, for Canada, As noted above, RCS survey methodology produces a random sample of respondents for each day of the survey period (typically the length of the campaign). The size of the daily sample generally ranges from roughly 100-as is typical of RCS data collected by the Canadian Election Study-to over 300-the peak daily sample size in the National Annenberg Election Study in 2000.
interactions of economic evaluations with campaign time (DAY), while controlling for important socio-demographics and party identification. 10 Two sets of models are examined: one that models the dynamics of economic effects as a linear function of time and one that models the dynamics as a curvilinear function of time. The latter is accomplished by adding an interaction between economic evaluations and the square of DAY (ECONEVAL*DAY²) to the former model, which includes only an interaction between economic evaluations and DAY (ECONEVAL*DAY). 11 Models are estimated by logit, separately for each election.
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A note on the measurement of economic evaluations. Economic effects on vote choice have been widely studied, so survey instrumentation concerning economic evaluations is commonplace and reasonably comparable across surveys. In the present sample of elections the typical item is some minor variation on the following:
How do you think the general economic situation in New Zealand now compares with a year ago? Is it the same, better or worse? [NZES 1999] All but three of the surveys (NAES 2000 , NZES 2002 , OES 2003 contain an item of this sort and, in the deviant surveys, reasonable proxies are easily found. 13 Even so, wording 10 Each vote model includes socio-demographic terms derived from the work of the principal investigators of each respective election study. The models include variables for all major party identifications. Details available from the author. 11 Models include main effects of DAY and DAY², as appropriate. That is, only the former in the linear models, and both in the curvilinear ones. Note also that the models are estimated with robust standard errors, correcting for clustering of observations within campaign days. This takes account of the fact that average levels of incumbent support may be higher or lower on certain days, even controlling for the variables included in the models. This results in slightly larger standard errors than would be obtained with the conventional calculation. 12 Note that estimating separate models for Quebec and the 'Rest of Canada' (ROC), as has become the norm in analysis of Canadian elections (e.g. Blais et al. 2002) , does little to disturb the interpretation of the dynamics of economic effects presented here. The general pattern of effects is common across the two sets of estimations, save for a minor deviation in 2000: that year, economic effects in Quebec seem to have declined substantially (if not in a statistically significant way) over the campaign, while they were generally unmoved in the ROC (details available from the author). Still, none of this upsets the conclusions of the present paper. 13 For the NAES 2000 and NZES 2002, the items query respondent attitudes toward the economy "today" and "these days," respectively. Both items have been found instructive in previous analyses of these elections (Johnston, Hagen and Jamieson 2004; Vowles et al. 2004 Blais et al. 2002) . Still, these effects are typically complimentary to the effects on incumbent support-that is, these relationships are typically negative. Thus, operationalizing vote choice as a dichotomy, where 1 indicates support for the incumbent and 0 indicates support for non-incumbent parties, is a useful simplifying assumption that does little violence to reality. The operationalization is also true to the pith-andsubstance of the economic voting model-reward and punishment of incumbent governments for their economic performances (Key 1968; Fiorina 1981) .
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Linear Models
Methodological preliminaries aside, the analysis can begin in Response to this item is strongly related to a more standard retrospective measure (analysis unreported) and has been found useful in earlier analysis of that election (Cutler et al. 2004 ). 14 Precise question wordings available from the author upon request. 15 Note that the dependent variable captures vote intention (measured in the pre-campaign, RCS component of each election study), as using reported vote would erase the time variation in political cognition that is at the heart of the present inquiry.
effect for the whole campaign assuming effects are time-invariant, and serves as an interpretive baseline. The heart of the matter is in the third and fourth columns of the on the probability of incumbent support for a respondent who is otherwise ambivalent between voting for the incumbent and some other party (or candidate in the US case).
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The final column presents the difference between these quantities, the 'marginal effect shift.' Note that this approach results in the maximum possible marginal effects and likely exaggerates over-time dynamics as they actually were in these elections. The virtue of this approach, however, is that it makes comparisons across elections more sensible than, for example, evaluating marginal effects with other variables set to mean values-in such an approach the baseline probability of incumbent support would vary across elections as a consequence of the shape of the logistic curve, not as a result of real variation in economic effects (see Long 1997 for details).
The first important point made by Table 1 is that economic effects on the vote were significant in all of these elections. The coefficients from the static model summarize the pattern. Effects were substantively large in most of these elections and strikingly so in These findings should comfort students of economic voting in general, and also upset accepted wisdom about some of these elections (especially Canada 1993 and 2000, although these are the smallest effects of the lot).
The real interest is in the over-time changes, of course, and these emerge in the pattern of effects in the dynamic models. The first observation also may be a surprising one: the modal finding is no trend in economic effects. According to these models, five of the ten 16 'Ambivalent' respondents in this set up are those who have a baseline probability of supporting the incumbent of .5, i.e. the linear predictor equals zero. Looking across the table, however, the overriding point is this: no one pattern would seem to characterize the campaign dynamics of economic voting. Sometimes the campaign helps, sometimes it hurts, and sometimes it does nothing at all, at least as regards the magnitude of economic effects.
Curvilinear Models
Perhaps this conclusion is the result of forcing a strict linear trend upon the dynamics of economic effects. The curvilinear set up, which incorporates an interaction between ECONEVAL and a quadratic DAY term, is obviously more flexible. In particular, these models allow for the possibility that the trend changes as the campaign progresses. A significant positive coefficient on ECONEVAL*DAY², for instance, implies that growth in the impact of economic evaluations on vote choice accelerates as time passes. This is a possibility contemplated by Gelman and King (1993) , among others, who suggest that voters have little incentive to pay much attention to the campaign until the very endwhen election day draws near and the need to overcome uncertainty about the candidates is at its height. Thus, they anticipate that the positive trend in economic effects on the vote will become steeper in the last days of the campaign. Of course, the coefficient on ECONEVAL*DAY² could also be negative, implying that the rate of growth decelerates as campaign time passes, although it is not clear why this might be so.
Both possibilities are realized in Table 2 . This table is set up much like Table 1 The remaining three elections show no evidence of interesting late campaign dynamics.
The coefficients on the quadratic interactions for Canada 1993 and 1997 are effectively zero-so these campaigns remain in the 'no movement' column-as is the coefficient on this term for UK 2001, a campaign that still appears to be basically 'de-enlightening' (if a little less so in terms of marginal effect shift than in the linear model).
Overall, then, reflections on the interaction between economic evaluations and a quadratic time term reinforce the conclusions following from the linear models: the modal result is no campaign dynamics in economic voting. Furthermore, the statistically significant late campaign movement that is uncovered undermines the 'enlightening'
campaigns that seemed to emerge from the linear models. 
A Closer Look at the Dynamics
Most of the foregoing spells trouble for general accounts of campaign dynamics, whether of the enlightenment or some other variety. Of the three theoretical possibilities canvassed in the opening section of the paper, the best fit is really a 'non-theory theory': election campaigns are (at least largely) unpredictable in advance of the campaign, so we should not expect any particular pattern in the dynamics of any particular campaign.
Need we go this far? Before passing judgment, a more inductive approach to the dynamics is in order.
This section of the paper takes a closer look at the campaign dynamics of economic voting by examining day-to-day change in economic effects. The approach is simple.
For each election, a vote model 18 is fit for each day of the campaign period. These estimates incorporate observations for five days-the period from two days before to two days after the day concerned. 19 The economic effects estimates resulting from this 'moving average estimation' are then plotted as a line, separately for each campaign, and appear as Figures 1A-J. If there are interpretable patterns in the dynamics of economic 18 The vote model for each election is the same as that in the 'static models' presented in Table 1 , with one difference: given collinearity among variables for certain periods in some elections, there is some variation in the composition of the vote models within elections. This seems to make little difference substantively, as the plots are little different if a common, reduced form of the model is used instead (details available from the author). This makes statistical sense, of course: if a variable is dropped because it is collinear with some other variable(s), whatever variance that dropped variable shares with economic evaluations will be absorbed elsewhere in the model. 19 As a result, no estimates are performed for the first two and last two days of the campaign period.
effects, this approach will surely find them. Note that the scale of these plots is not constant: it changes a little from election to election, depending on the range of economic effects observed and the length of the campaign. The 'outliers' in this respect are the US and Canada 2000, where economic effects were quite modest throughout the campaign period. 20 This means little for interpretation of dynamics within elections (although sampling error is more pronounced in the plots covering a narrow range), but it rules out simplistic comparisons across campaigns. to suggest that, as a whole, the electorate is no more settled on the important elements of the vote at the end of the campaign than at the beginning. This is a bracing finding.
How do conclusions drawn from Tables 1 and 2 Overall, then, the graphical analysis ends up in a place that is partially of a piece with, partially at odds with the conclusions of the more formal statistical analysis. The theories on offer do not capture the findings. At the same time, the modal result does not seem to be 'no campaign dynamics in economic voting.' Indeed, the plots at times bespeak massive swings in the impact of the economy on the vote. And there is something new to explain: endpoint spikes in economic effects.
Discussion and Conclusion
The dominant pattern in the campaign dynamics of economic voting does not square with either of the obvious theoretical stories. Most strikingly, the campaigns examined here do not appear to have been enlightening, at least not in any simplistic, monotonic way, as implied by the literature. At the same time, the campaigns were not simply diverting affairs. In short, no straightforward linear trend-either positive or negativesummarizes the dynamics very well.
The failure of the enlightenment view is the bigger surprise. There is evidence of enlightenment in election campaigns (see fn. 1 above). Most of the work speaks only indirectly to the campaign dynamics of economic voting, but the direct evidence on the question is compelling (Bartels Forthcoming) . We also have the predictive record of dozens of election forecasting models for which we must account. How can economic variables be so predictive in the aggregate if there is no particular tendency for campaigns to enliven the economy-vote link?
Perhaps this begs the question. It might be that there is some chronic level of voter attentiveness to economic considerations that is sufficient for the forecasting models to work, at least most of the time. Still, it would be strange if such a chronic level of attentiveness were so plastic in the campaign season.
Upsetting the enlightenment view raises another interesting question: when does enlightenment happen? One key variable seems to be campaign balance. The argument is this: whatever the incentives of campaigners to draw voter attention to fundamental considerations-like the economy-they may not always have the resources with which to do so. A weak opposition may never be able to enforce accountability on incumbents, for instance. Enlightenment dynamics in the domain of the economy may also be elastic to some of the variables that have been found important in the cross-national literature on economic voting-clarity of responsibility, the presence of viable alternatives, and the like (Powell and Whitten 1993; Anderson 1995) . To the extent that these features of context vary across the set of elections examined here, these variables may go some distance in explaining the overall pattern. This is a compelling research agenda. The 'artefact hypothesis' is a fascinating suggestion to which the present analysis cannot speak very clearly, but there is reason for doubt. In order for this process to account for the catastrophic collapses in economic effects observed across so many of these elections, two premises would have to be true: these ambivalent, uninformed respondents make up a hugely disproportionate share of survey respondents at the end of election campaigns; and the nature of economic effects on vote choice for such respondents is seriously at odds with-often the inverse of-such effects for other respondents. Neither premise seems very plausible.
What, then, explains the endpoint spike? All is speculation. One possibility is that the hurly burly of the final week of campaigning-with its typical focus on candidates and personalities-undoes much of the 'good work' of the early campaign. Another possibility is that the final week of the campaign fixes voter attention on fundamentals other than the economy: campaign organization on the ground is all about mobilizing the base-perhaps the process primes partisanship and social group memberships, forcing economic and related 'nature of the times' (Campbell et al. 1960) considerations from centre stage. Of course, the spike implies that these elements of the vote are themselves waiting in the wings in the weeks prior to the final week of mobilization. The claim seems implausible on its face and is also at odds-once again-with the accumulated evidence in favour of campaign enlightenment. Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
